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The Determinants of Aid in the Post-Cold War Era
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Howard J. Wall
The authors estimate the responsiveness of aid to recipient countries’ economic and physical
needs, civil/political rights, and government effectiveness. They look exclusively at the post-
Cold War era and use fixed effects to control for the political, strategic, and other considerations
of donors. They find that aid and per capita income have been negatively related, while aid has
been positively related to infant mortality, rights, and government effectiveness. (JEL F35)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November/December 2007, 89(6), pp. 533-47.
dichotomy—recipient needs versus donor inter-
ests—to models of aid allocation. As laid out by
Maizels and Nissanke (1984, p. 879), in the
recipient-needs model, “aid is given to compen-
sate for the shortfalls in domestic resources,”
whereas in the donor-interests model, aid serves
donors’ “political/security, investment, and trade
interests.” Maizels and Nissanke found that multi-
lateral aid tended to follow the recipient-needs
model, while bilateral aid tended to follow the
donor-interests model, although there were ele-
ments of each model in both types of aid.2
Subsequent research has added two other
categories—civil/political rights and recipient-
country institutions—to the McKinlay and Little
dichotomy, although not all papers deal with all
four categories simultaneously.3 For example,
T
his paper estimates the extent to which
aid, or official development assistance,
is related to measures of recipient
countries’ physical and economic
needs, civil/political rights, and government
effectiveness. We examine the post-Cold War era,
which thus far has not been the focus of substan-
tial research, although there are fairly obvious
reasons to believe that the differences in the
geopolitics between the pre- and post-Cold War
eras amount to a structural difference in terms
of aid allocation.
There are many reasons why we should be
interested in the determinants of aid levels. First,
because aid is an important means by which
donor countries and agencies try to alleviate
poverty, we should care about whether aid is
being directed towards those most in need of it.
Similarly, we should also be interested in whether
aid tends to go more towards where it might be
most effective, as measured by the effectiveness
of the recipient government in making use of the
aid or in fostering economic growth.1
Early studies of aid allocation tend to apply
some version of the McKinlay and Little (1979)
1 See Boone (1996) and Kosack (2003) for discussions of the links
between institutions and aid effectiveness. Also, in Burnside and
Dollar (2000 and 2004) the impact of aid on growth depends on
the quality of recipient-state institutions and policies; although
Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) and Rajan and Subramanian
(2005) found little or no evidence of this.
2 See also Dowling and Hiemenz (1985).
3 Neumayer (2003b) provided an excellent survey of the literature.
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© 2007, Elsevier, reprinted with permission.Wall (1995) found that countries with lower per
capita incomes tended to receive higher levels of
aid per capita, although aid was not related to
infant mortality or to civil/political rights. On the
other hand, Trumbull and Wall (1994) found that,
when recipient-country fixed effects are included
to control for donor interests, aid levels respond
to changes in infant mortality and rights, but not
to changes in per capita income.
Alesina and Dollar (2000) included a variety
of variables, such as trade openness, colonial
history, and friendliness at the United Nations
(UN), to capture the effects of donor interests.
They concluded that, although aid is related to
per capita income and democracy (but not to civil
rights), it is as much directed by political and
strategic considerations. A pair of recent studies
focus on the institutions of the recipient countries:
Alesina and Weder (2002) found that corrupt
governments do not tend to receive less aid than
“clean” governments, and Dollar and Levin (2004)
found that, over time, aid has become directed
more towards countries with sound institutions
and policies, although there were differences
across bilateral donors and multilateral agencies.
In a series of papers, Eric Neumayer provided
a detailed analysis of the relationship between aid
and civil/political rights.4 In Neumayer (2003a),
UN agencies were found to respond to economic
and possibly civil/political-development needs,
but not necessarily to political freedom and cor-
ruption. There is some evidence in Neumayer
(2003b) that high levels of rights or improvements
in rights mean higher bilateral aid, but Neumayer
concluded that the role of rights is limited and
did not increase after the end of the Cold War.
Finally, Neumayer (2003c) found that although
respect for rights tends to play a role at the selec-
tion stage, there is significant inconsistency in the
application of rights to the determination of the
levels of bilateral aid.
This paper focuses on three of the four cate-
gories of aid determinants—recipient needs, civil/
political rights, and recipient-government effec-
tiveness—while following Trumbull and Wall
(1994) in using fixed effects to control for the
fourth category, the strategic and political interests
of donor countries. The advantage of this approach
is that, because we do not have to choose strategic/
political variables explicitly, we avoid the prob-
lems that can arise if there are excluded variables
that determine both the level of aid and one or
more of our other explanatory variables. This
means that we do not run the risk of heterogeneity
bias because of omitted time-invariant factors
related to history, geography, culture, etc. If these
factors, which are primarily the sort of factors
that are used to measure donor interests, are not
completely specified and they are correlated with
aid and one or more of the included explanatory
variables, then heterogeneity bias is the result.
The relative shortness of our sample provides
comfort that fixed effects provide a useful control
for donor interests.
While our fixed-effects approach follows
Trumbull and Wall (1994), there are two main
differences between our analysis and theirs. The
first and more obvious difference is that we are
able to look at a more recent time period, so our
results should be more relevant for understanding
the present situation. Second, because we use a
quadratic rather than a log-linear functional form,
we are able to provide a richer analysis of the
functional relationship between aid and the
variables of interest.
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
Our dependent variable, Aidit, is real net
official development assistance from all sources
for country i in year t. Data are taken from the
World Bank and are denominated in constant
2000 U.S. dollars. We estimate the following
reduced-form regression, in which i denotes the
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4 See also Neumayer (2003d).The intercept includes a component, ʱ0, that is
common to all recipient countries, and a recipient-
country fixed effect, ʱi, that is specific to each
recipient country but fixed over the sample period.
We also include a period effect, ʳt, that is common
to all countries in the sample but varies over time.
Our two recipient-needs variables are real gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita and infant
mortality, both of which are from the World Bank.5
We think it is important to include both of these
variables because each captures a different ele-
ment of recipient need: Per capita income captures
economic need while infant mortality represents
physical need. Although clearly correlated in
the long run, economic and physical needs do
not necessarily move in the same direction over
shorter periods of time, and aid is clearly meant
to respond to both.
For our rights variable, we use the sum of
the civil liberties and political rights indices pro-
duced by Freedom House. For each category, the
Freedom House index scores countries from 1 to 7,
with 1 being the most free and 7 being the most
restrictive. For the regression here, we have
reversed the order, so that the level of rights
increases with the index. Our measure of recipient-
government effectiveness is from the World Bank’s
Governance Indicators (see Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi, 2006), which scores governments
between −2.5 and 2.5 on the basis of the compe-
tence of their bureaucracy and the quality of public
service delivery. Finally, we include recipient-
country population to capture differences in
recipient-country size. The quadratic specifica-
tion enables us to consider the extent of popula-
tion bias, by which the per capita aid allocation
falls with country size: A concave relationship
between the level of aid and population is con-
sistent with a population bias.
We have three years of data, 1995, 2000, and
2003. After eliminating observations for which
data are incomplete and countries for which there
are fewer than two useful observations, we are
left with 135 recipient countries and 395 obser-
vations. The sample statistics for all variables are
provided in Table 1, and the country averages of
the variables are provided in the data appendix.
The distribution of average aid to countries
in our sample is illustrated by Figure 1. The mean
country in our sample received $357 million per
year in aid, although the median country, Yemen,
received only $226 million, indicating that aid
was skewed toward a few countries. Specifically,
there were 13 countries that received more than
$1 billion in aid per year, the top five of which
were China, Poland, Congo, Indonesia, and
Russia. At the other extreme, four countries in
our sample—Singapore, the Bahamas, St. Kitts,
and Kuwait—averaged less than $10 million in
aid receipts per year.
Figure 2 provides a different angle on the
distribution of aid across countries by showing
the shares of total aid received. The three coun-
tries receiving the most aid—China, Poland, and
Congo—alone accounted for 13 percent of the
total. These countries plus the 10 countries that
received between $900 million and $1,800 million
per year accounted for a larger share of aid (40
percent) than did the 102 countries that received
less than $450 million per year.
To get a clear picture of how aid is distributed,
we need to control for the sizes of the recipient
countries, so Figure 3 plots the within-country
averages of our explanatory variables against per
capita aid. These plots serve to illustrate the
simple correlations between the dependent and
independent variables as well as the distribution
of the values of our independent variables.
Bandyopadhyay and Wall
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Real aid ($ millions) 356.93 439.26
Real GDP per capita ($ thousands) 4.96 4.54
Infant mortality 52.33 39.56
Civil/political rights 8.29 3.39
Government effectiveness –0.30 0.67
Population (millions) 36.25 139.51Bandyopadhyay and Wall
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Aid Per Capita and the Explanatory Variables (country averages)Note that the vast majority of our recipient
countries had average per capita incomes around
or below $10,000, although there were nine coun-
tries with average incomes above $15,000: Israel
and Singapore were the richest of these countries,
followed by Kuwait, Malta, Slovenia, Bahrain,
Seychelles, the Bahamas, and the Czech Republic.
There was a general tendency for relatively poor
countries to receive more aid per capita, but some
countries’ receipts were well in excess of the
sample average. For example, eight countries—
Tonga, Cape Verde, Dominica, Vanuatu, Samoa,
St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Seychelles—saw aver-
age per capita aid that was more than two stan-
dard deviations above the mean. At the other
extreme, six countries—Nigeria, China, Brazil,
Kuwait, India, and Saudi Arabia—received less
than $2 per capita.
From the second panel in Figure 3, it is clear
that the eight countries listed above as having
the highest per capita aid allocation also tended
to have relatively low rates of infant mortality.
Also note from this panel that there was a nega-
tive correlation between average per capita aid
and infant mortality; the three countries with the
highest average infant mortality rates—Sierra
Leone, Niger, and Angola—received only about
the average level of aid per capita.
As the third panel of Figure 3 shows, our
civil/political rights variable was pretty evenly
distributed across the countries in our sample,
and there was a general positive correlation
between per capita aid allocation and rights. In
fact, of the eight countries listed above as receiv-
ing the most aid per person, only two—Tonga
and Seychelles—had civil/political rights scores
below 12. According to the fourth panel, there was
no apparent correlation between aid per capita
and the effectiveness of recipient-country govern-
ments. Also, the governments were clustered
below the mediocre score of +1, with Singapore
as the lone really effective government. Still, there
is significant variation among countries, with
many scoring worse than –1. Finally, consistent
with the notion of population bias, the fifth panel
illustrates the tendency for the smallest (largest)
countries to receive the highest (lowest) levels of
aid per capita.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
While the distributions and correlations dis-
cussed above are suggestive, they are, of course,
inadequate for addressing whether aid is respon-
sive to needs, rights, government effectiveness,
and/or donor interests. Therefore, we need to con-
trol for all four categories of variables simultane-
ously, as in our regression equation above, to
determine the influence of each category individ-
ually on aid.
We first estimate the model under the restric-
tion that fixed effects, which we use to control
for donor interests and other omitted factors, do
not matter (ʱi = 0￿i), and then without these
restrictions. So that we can control for recipient-
specific heteroskedasticity, we estimate both
models with feasible generalized least squares.
Table 2 provides the regression results for both
models, while Table 3 provides the Wald tests
for the joint significance of those explanatory
variables with quadratic specifications. For each
estimation, we have produced a set of figures
(Figures 4 and 5) to illustrate the shapes of the
estimated relationships between aid and the five
explanatory variables. Table 4 reports for the two
models the effect on aid of one-standard-deviation
increases in each of the five explanatory variables
for the average country.
Model without Fixed Effects
In the estimation without fixed effects, the
effects of all of our explanatory variables except
for the civil/political rights variable are statisti-
cally different from zero. This is according to the
t-statistics for the coefficients on the variables
with linear specifications and according to the
Wald tests in Table 3 for the variables with quad-
ratic specifications. Thus, according to this model,
the level of aid is responsive to recipient needs
(as measured by per capita income and by infant
mortality), the effectiveness of recipient-country
governments, and population, but not to civil/
political rights.
For the nature of these relationships, refer to
Figure 4, which illustrates the U-shapes of the
relationships between aid and both needs vari-
ables; i.e., from high levels of need (low income
Bandyopadhyay and Wall
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brings an increase in aid. On the other hand, at
low levels of need, an increase in need brings a
decrease in aid. This rather peculiar result is not
much of a concern when looking at per capita
income, however, because there are very few
countries with incomes on the upward-sloping
portion of the relationship. As reported in Table 4,
a one-standard-deviation increase in per capita
GDP (about $4,500) from the average (about
$5,000) means a decrease in aid of $90 million.
The U-shape of the relationship for infant mor-
tality is more troubling because the majority of
countries have infant mortality levels that would
place them on the downward-sloping portion of
the relationship (see Figure 3). For example, for
Bandyopadhyay and Wall
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Table 2
Regression Results: Dependent Variable = Level of Real Aid
No fixed effects With fixed effects
Coefficient Standard error t-Statistic Coefficient Standard error t-Statistic
Common intercept 564.693* 48.850 11.56 400.684* 126.088 3.18
Recipient fixed effects No Yes
2000 dummy –56.913* 12.688 –4.49 –82.195* 6.984 –11.77
2003 dummy –18.343 12.985 –1.41 –11.714 10.667 –1.10
Real GDP per capita –78.178* 5.955 –13.13 –116.490* 8.848 –13.17
Real GDP per capita squared 2.646* 0.268 9.86 3.927* 0.387 10.14
Infant mortality –3.053* 0.693 –4.41 3.632* 1.291 2.81
Infant mortality squared 0.022* 0.004 5.75 –0.015* 0.008 –1.95
Civil/political rights 0.212 1.841 0.12 8.940* 2.486 3.60
Government effectiveness 114.432* 13.934 8.21 82.453* 12.856 6.41
Population (millions) 7.497* 0.394 19.01 13.419* 2.815 4.77
Population squared –0.005* 0.000 –10.78 –0.012* 0.002 –6.95
Log likelihood –2,563.56 –2,264.07
Number of observations 395 395
Number of recipient countries 135 135
Estimated coefficients 11 145
NOTE: Estimated using feasible generalized least squares, allowing for recipient-specific heteroskedasticity; *indicates statistical signifi-
cance at the 10 percent level.
Table 3
Wald Tests of Joint Significance
No fixed effects With fixed effects
ˇ2 Probability > ˇ2 ˇ2 Probability > ˇ2
Real GDP per capita 202.53 0.000 174.00 0.000
Infant mortality 46.40 0.000 8.37 0.015
Population 388.91 0.000 49.34 0.000a country with the sample average rate of infant
mortality (about 52), a one-standard-deviation
increase in infant mortality (about 40) means a
decrease in aid of $19 million.
The two other statistically significant explana-
tory variables are worth noting. First, in this
model, aid is fairly responsive to government
effectiveness: The difference between the least-
effective government and the most-effective gov-
ernment is close to $550 million. Put another way,
a one-standard-deviation increase from the aver-
age level of government effectiveness (–0.30) to
the still-mediocre level of 0.37 means a $75 mil-
lion increase in aid. And, finally, the hill shape
of the relationship between aid and population
confirms the oft-observed population bias; i.e.,
per capita aid falls with population. In fact, the
bias is strong enough that for countries with
Bandyopadhyay and Wall
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Relationships without Fixed Effectspopulations above around 700 million (just India
and China), an increase in population means a
decrease in the level of aid, not just per capita aid.
Model with Fixed Effects
When we do not impose the restrictions that
the fixed effects are all zero (i.e., the intercepts
are the same for all recipients), we find that all
five explanatory variables are statistically signifi-
cant in explaining levels of aid. Further, a likeli-
hood-ratio test easily rejects the null hypothesis
that the fixed effects are all zero, meaning that this
is the statistically preferred model. Because there
are no theory-based reasons to impose these
restrictions, it is also the preferred model in terms
of theory. The rejection of these restrictions on
the fixed effects has important implications for
our interpretation of the relationships between
Bandyopadhyay and Wall
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Relationships with Fixed Effectsaid and the explanatory variables and highlights
the importance of controlling for donor interests.
Comparing Figures 4 and 5, for which axes
in corresponding figures have the same scale, it
is clear that the estimated relationships between
aid and each of the variables differ importantly
between the two models. Even though per capita
income, infant mortality, government effective-
ness, and population are statistically significant
in both, the actual responsive of aid differs
between models.
The relationship between aid and per capita
GDP has the same U-shape as in the previous
model, with the upward-sloping portion having
very few recipient countries. In this model,
however, aid is more responsive to per capita
income: A one-standard-deviation increase in
per capita GDP means a $135 million decrease
in aid for the average country, which is 50 per-
cent higher than with the previous model (see
Table 4).
The relationship between aid and infant
mortality differs a great deal between the two
models. Recall that in the first model, the relation-
ship was U-shaped and most countries’ levels of
infant mortality put them on the downward-
sloping portion of the curve. But in the preferred
model, the relationship is hill-shaped and is
upward-sloping for all but a handful of countries.
For the average country, a one-standard-deviation
increase in infant mortality means a $27 million
increase in aid. One might expect that the rela-
tionship between aid and infant mortality, if
positive, would be convex rather than concave
as we have found. One reason for the concavity
is that, while higher levels of infant mortality
indicate greater need, they might also indicate
health care systems that are less effective at mak-
ing use of any money that they receive. If so,
donors might then be allocating more of their
limited aid budgets to countries with better health
care systems, where each dollar of aid might have
a larger impact on well-being. At the extreme, for
those countries with the very highest levels of
infant mortality and least effective health care sys-
tems, this concavity might make the relationship
between aid and infant mortality a negative one.
An increase in the civil/political rights vari-
able means an increase in aid according to the
preferred model, in contrast with the no-fixed-
effects model, for which it was statistically
insignificant. A one-standard-deviation increase
in civil/political rights means an increase in aid
of $29 million. Recipient-government effective-
ness matters in both models, although it matters
somewhat less in the model with fixed effects. A
one-standard-deviation increase in government
effectiveness means a $54 million increase in
aid, which is $21 million less than from the first
model. Finally, because the estimated relation-
ship between aid and population is concave, we
find a population bias, which is somewhat larger
than in the first model. Per capita aid falls more
than twice as fast in this model, and the peak of
the relationship is at a lower population level.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have estimated the respon-
siveness of total aid in the post-Cold War era to
the needs, civil/political rights, and government
effectiveness of recipient countries. To do so, we
used the approach espoused in Trumbull and Wall
(1994): to use fixed effects to control for donor
interests. We have found that aid in this era gen-
erally responded negatively to per capita GDP
and positively to infant mortality, rights, and
government effectiveness. This is in contrast
with much of the existing literature, which, while
Bandyopadhyay and Wall
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Table 4
Responsiveness of Aid to Explanatory
Variables
No With
fixed effects fixed effects
Real GDP per capita –90 –135
Infant mortality –19 27
Civil/political rights 1 29
Government effectiveness 75 54
Population 1,013 1,734
NOTE: Change in aid ($ millions) for the average country from
a one-standard-deviation increase in the explanatory variable.tending to find a negative link between aid and
per capita income, has been decidedly more
mixed in terms of the other variables.
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Real aid Real aid per capita Infant political Government
Country per capita ($) ($ millions) ($ thousands) mortality rights effectiveness Population
Albania 88.9 280.0 3.6 23.0 8.7 –0.49 3.2
Algeria 8.3 247.9 5.4 38.3 4.7 –0.69 30.1
Angola 33.8 410.6 1.9 154.0 4.3 –1.33 12.3
Argentina 3.1 111.8 11.5 18.7 12.0 0.11 36.5
Armenia 72.3 228.7 2.6 35.7 8.0 –0.52 3.2
Azerbaijan 22.7 182.9 2.6 77.3 4.7 –0.96 8.0
Bahamas 17.9 5.2 15.8 17.0 13.5 0.96 0.3
Bahrain 71.9 46.0 16.2 13.0 4.3 0.66 0.7
Bangladesh 10.1 1,297.0 1.5 58.3 8.7 –0.59 129.7
Belarus 10.3 104.0 4.7 14.0 4.7 –1.04 10.0
Belize 64.4 15.4 5.6 34.3 13.7 –0.20 0.2
Benin 45.1 273.5 1.0 96.0 12.0 –0.12 6.1
Bolivia 87.0 711.1 2.4 60.7 10.7 –0.47 8.2
Botswana 33.4 52.3 7.2 68.7 12.0 0.73 1.6
Brazil 1.8 299.5 7.2 36.3 10.3 –0.14 168.7
Bulgaria 34.4 275.4 6.4 13.3 12.0 –0.22 8.1
Burkina Faso 39.5 431.8 1.0 108.0 7.7 –0.49 11.1
Burundi 31.3 205.6 0.6 114.0 4.3 –1.20 6.7
Cambodia 40.3 494.0 1.8 93.3 4.3 –0.57 12.4
Cameroon 37.7 565.6 1.8 94.0 3.7 –0.70 14.9
Cape Verde 279.6 119.1 4.7 31.0 13.3 0.04 0.4
Central African Republic 29.0 101.9 1.1 115.0 7.3 –1.15 3.7
Chad 27.3 206.9 1.0 117.0 5.0 –0.64 7.7
Chile 6.6 97.2 9.0 10.3 12.7 1.27 15.1
China 1.8 2,252.6 3.8 33.0 2.7 0.19 1,252.0
Colombia 8.7 376.8 6.4 20.7 8.0 –0.18 41.8
Comoros 54.8 29.1 1.7 63.0 7.0 –1.04 0.6
Congo, Democratic 34.7 1,826.4 0.8 129.0 7.0 –1.38 48.7
Republic
Congo, Republic 24.5 78.5 1.0 81.0 3.3 –1.79 3.4
Costa Rica 6.9 25.2 8.4 10.7 13.0 0.46 3.7
Cote d’Ivoire 43.8 635.7 1.5 114.0 5.0 –0.65 15.5
Croatia 17.7 79.4 9.3 7.7 10.3 0.09 4.5
Czech Republic 27.5 282.4 15.5 5.0 13.0 0.72 10.3
Djibouti 136.1 86.3 2.1 103.3 6.0 –1.00 0.7
Dominica 243.9 17.6 5.3 14.3 14.0 –0.45 0.1
Dominican Republic 10.6 85.9 6.0 34.7 10.7 –0.28 8.3
Ecuador 15.4 186.6 3.4 28.3 10.3 –0.86 12.3Bandyopadhyay and Wall




Real aid Real aid per capita Infant political Government
Country per capita ($) ($ millions) ($ thousands) mortality rights effectiveness Population
Egypt, Arab Republic 23.6 1,454.0 3.4 43.0 4.3 –0.10 63.2
El Salvador 37.9 228.0 4.6 34.7 10.7 –0.28 6.1
Equatorial Guinea 68.7 28.9 1.5 108.0 2.0 –1.89 0.4
Eritrea 51.5 209.4 1.0 56.0 4.3 –0.50 4.0
Estonia 49.9 69.0 9.6 10.3 12.7 0.84 1.4
Ethiopia 16.2 1,024.4 0.7 117.0 6.3 –0.63 63.1
Fiji 52.3 42.0 5.1 18.3 8.3 –0.20 0.8
Gabon 75.2 84.0 6.3 60.0 7.0 –0.79 1.2
Gambia, The 40.9 52.1 1.7 92.7 5.0 –0.20 1.3
Georgia 42.2 201.5 2.0 41.0 7.7 –0.62 4.8
Ghana 37.5 721.2 1.9 63.3 10.3 –0.02 19.3
Grenada 129.6 13.1 6.9 21.7 13.0 –0.07 0.1
Guatemala 21.7 241.6 3.8 41.0 8.0 –0.60 11.2
Guinea 39.2 276.7 1.9 115.0 5.0 –0.71 7.3
Guinea-Bissau 86.4 115.4 0.8 133.7 7.3 –1.21 1.3
Guyana 124.5 94.2 3.9 56.0 12.0 –0.23 0.8
Haiti 52.8 395.1 1.7 82.7 5.0 –1.54 7.9
Honduras 66.9 419.3 2.5 34.0 10.0 –0.71 6.4
Hungary 24.2 243.4 13.9 8.5 13.0 0.76 10.1
India 1.4 1,421.4 2.4 68.3 10.0 –0.09 1,004.2
Indonesia 7.7 1,573.4 3.1 37.3 7.0 –0.23 204.6
Iran, Islamic Republic 2.5 154.5 5.8 37.3 3.7 –0.34 63.0
Israel 85.0 526.7 22.3 6.0 12.0 1.12 6.2
Jamaica 17.5 43.7 3.6 17.0 11.3 –0.19 2.6
Jordan 157.5 768.3 4.0 25.7 7.3 0.30 4.8
Kazakhstan 11.3 171.3 4.8 61.0 5.0 –0.70 15.3
Kenya 20.4 588.6 1.0 76.3 6.0 –0.70 29.6
Kuwait 1.7 3.5 17.1 9.7 6.7 0.29 2.1
Kyrgyz Republic 49.3 236.9 1.5 60.7 6.0 –0.61 4.9
Lao PDR 58.2 299.7 1.5 92.3 3.0 –0.52 5.2
Latvia 37.4 89.1 7.9 13.0 12.7 0.35 2.4
Lebanon 48.3 206.2 4.3 28.3 5.0 –0.25 4.3
Lesotho 45.7 78.3 2.1 74.7 9.0 –0.05 1.7
Lithuania 61.2 215.0 8.9 10.0 13.0 0.37 3.5
Macedonia, FYR 91.8 186.0 5.8 15.0 9.3 –0.33 2.0
Madagascar 25.2 386.3 0.8 85.7 10.0 –0.46 15.2
Malawi 45.8 463.0 0.6 120.7 10.0 –0.69 10.2
Malaysia 3.9 88.9 8.5 8.7 6.7 0.91 22.9Bandyopadhyay and Wall




Real aid Real aid per capita Infant political Government
Country per capita ($) ($ millions) ($ thousands) mortality rights effectiveness Population
Mali 45.7 482.0 0.8 125.7 11.3 –0.70 10.7
Malta 35.0 13.6 16.7 7.0 14.0 1.08 0.4
Mauritania 89.8 230.5 1.7 86.7 4.7 0.02 2.6
Mauritius 19.9 22.9 8.7 18.5 13.0 0.75 1.2
Mexico 2.8 257.8 8.2 26.5 10.0 –0.01 96.7
Moldova 23.7 101.4 1.4 27.3 9.0 –0.73 4.3
Mongolia 95.1 226.6 1.6 61.0 11.3 –0.15 2.4
Morocco 17.1 483.6 3.5 42.7 6.3 –0.01 28.4
Mozambique 58.2 1,002.7 0.9 113.3 9.0 –0.47 17.4
Namibia 91.9 166.3 5.8 51.0 11.0 0.37 1.9
Nepal 19.3 433.4 1.3 71.3 8.3 –0.56 22.7
Nicaragua 138.2 685.9 3.1 35.0 9.3 –0.65 5.0
Niger 29.7 312.4 0.8 163.0 8.0 –0.90 10.5
Nigeria 1.9 238.3 0.9 106.7 6.0 –1.11 124.9
Oman 21.7 50.5 12.5 12.3 4.7 0.86 2.4
Pakistan 6.4 868.9 1.9 81.7 6.0 –0.50 136.3
Panama 10.6 29.5 6.0 20.3 12.3 –0.21 2.8
Papua New Guinea 60.2 295.6 2.5 70.3 10.3 –0.66 5.1
Paraguay 18.8 93.7 4.7 26.3 9.3 –1.04 5.2
Peru 16.6 426.2 4.8 34.7 9.3 –0.32 25.6
Philippines 10.2 752.6 3.9 31.0 10.7 0.04 75.5
Poland 57.4 2,212.6 9.9 9.3 13.0 0.52 38.5
Romania 19.9 441.8 6.5 19.3 11.0 –0.46 22.3
Russian Federation 10.3 1,500.2 7.3 17.3 7.0 –0.47 145.7
Rwanda 71.0 465.9 1.1 120.0 3.7 –0.67 7.3
Samoa 206.6 35.2 4.8 21.3 12.0 0.13 0.2
Saudi Arabia 1.1 23.5 12.7 24.3 2.0 –0.04 20.5
Senegal 57.7 523.7 1.5 80.7 9.0 –0.09 9.4
Seychelles 172.2 13.7 15.9 13.3 10.0 –0.59 0.1
Sierra Leone 46.2 229.1 0.6 168.0 6.3 –1.01 5.0
Singapore 2.7 9.6 21.5 3.5 6.0 2.47 3.8
Slovak Republic 23.0 123.6 11.1 8.7 12.3 0.37 5.4
Slovenia 30.2 60.1 16.3 5.0 13.3 0.79 2.0
Solomon Islands 143.1 59.1 2.0 21.7 10.3 –1.15 0.4
South Africa 11.6 500.1 9.6 49.3 13.0 0.48 43.0
Sri Lanka 27.6 504.6 3.3 16.7 8.7 –0.25 18.3
St. Kitts and Nevis 96.2 4.1 10.4 23.0 13.0 –0.06 0.0
St. Lucia 172.6 25.8 5.5 17.0 13.0 0.21 0.2Bandyopadhyay and Wall
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Country per capita ($) ($ millions) ($ thousands) mortality rights effectiveness Population
St. Vincent and the 192.0 21.3 5.3 20.7 13.0 –0.09 0.1
Grenadines
Sudan 11.3 358.5 1.7 65.7 2.0 –1.39 31.0
Swaziland 35.3 34.0 4.4 93.7 4.7 –0.50 1.0
Syrian Arab Republic 15.3 233.3 3.3 20.3 2.0 –0.64 15.9
Tajikistan 17.9 110.6 0.9 81.7 3.7 –1.32 6.1
Tanzania 35.5 1,183.9 0.5 103.7 7.7 –0.63 33.1
Thailand 13.5 805.0 6.4 27.0 10.0 0.33 59.7
Togo 26.0 107.0 1.6 80.3 5.3 –1.10 4.4
Tonga 292.9 29.0 6.2 17.3 8.0 –0.42 0.1
Tunisia 20.5 197.7 6.0 23.3 5.0 0.78 9.5
Turkey 4.2 274.8 6.3 40.3 7.3 –0.04 66.6
Turkmenistan 6.4 29.2 4.1 76.0 2.0 –1.39 4.6
Uganda 38.6 877.5 1.2 86.0 6.3 –0.31 22.9
Ukraine 8.0 397.8 4.5 17.3 8.3 –0.70 49.8
Uruguay 10.9 35.6 8.3 15.7 13.3 0.61 3.3
Uzbekistan 6.2 153.5 1.5 59.3 2.7 –0.96 24.3
Vanuatu 224.2 41.9 3.0 36.3 12.0 –0.38 0.2
Venezuela, RB 2.8 67.3 5.5 20.0 9.0 –0.87 24.0
Vietnam 18.1 1,420.6 2.0 24.7 2.7 –0.23 77.6
Yemen, Republic 13.1 226.0 0.8 85.0 5.3 –0.70 17.3
Zambia 126.7 1,177.6 0.8 102.0 8.0 –0.80 9.7
Zimbabwe 30.3 355.9 2.6 66.5 5.5 –0.69 12.1548 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW